"No Law to Apply"
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The three main tasks that courts perform are (1) finding facts, (2)
applying law, and (3) exercising discretion. Judges commonly regard
the exercise of discretion as their most challenging task..
The Supreme Court since 1971 has seemingly assumed that a
court may not review administrative action when it has "no law to
apply." Yet agencies probably go wrong more frequently in exercising discretion than in finding facts or applying law, and exercise of
judicial discretion is needed to correct agencies' abuse of discretion.
The strange assumption that a court is helpless when it has no law
to apply may have originated in a dictum in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). The Court spoke
of the Administrative Procedure Act's exception to the judicial review provisions for action "committed to agency discretion," and it
said of the exception:
The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act indicates that it

[the exception to judicial review] is applicable in those rare instances where
"statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law
to apply." S. Rep. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945).

The Court was clearly mistaken about the legislative history. The
words the Court quoted from the Senate committee were those of
the committee, but all that the committee said was:
If ... statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is
no law to apply, courts have no statutory question to review.

The committee was obviously right in saying that courts have "no
statutory question" when "there is no law to apply." The committee
did not say and did not imply that a court should deny review when
it has no law to apply.
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Nothing in the statute and nothing in the legislative history supports the Overton Park dictum that a court may not review in absence of law to apply.
Furthermore, nothing in good sense supports the dictum. Administrative errors that are in need of judicial correction may involve
facts, law, or discretion. When judicial review is appropriate, one
main need may be for exercise of judicialdiscretion in reviewing the
agency's exercise of discretion.
Judicial review of agency discretion is clearly appropriate whether
or not a question of law is also involved. After all, the Administrative Procedure Act specifically provides: "The reviewing court shall
• . . set aside agency action.

. .

found to be . . . an abuse of dis-

cretion," (subject to an exception for agency action committed to
agency discretion, including military and foreign affairs decisions of
the President). 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). Interpreting the APA is often
difficult, but the difficulty does not involve the clear provisions that
courts may review discretion as well as facts and law.
Congress stated quite clearly in the APA that it intended courts to
review administrative action for abuse of discretion, and an abuse of
discretion may or may not involve law.
What is or is not "an abuse of discretion" is sometimes governed
by law, but usually it is not; a court's determination of whether an
agency has abused its discretion usually does not involve application
of law but involves nothing more than judicial discretion.
The relatively easy task of a court that is reviewing administrative
action is to determine whether the agency has violated established
law; the relatively difficult task is to determine whether, in the whole
setting, the agency has abused its discretion. When law guides the
court, the judges simply interpret and apply the law. But when the
question is whether the agency has abused its discretion, the court
has to do something more onerous than to apply law - it has to
determine what is or is not an abuse of discretion, and that usually
requires the court to exercise judicial discretion.
The most important decision denying review of administrative action on the ground of "no law to apply" may now be Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), and the best way to understand the
strange phenomenon of "no law to apply" is probably by a strong
focus on the single case. In what follows, we shall (I) summarize the
main ideas in the Chaney opinion, (II) try to penetrate the "no law
to apply" concept in the Chaney context, (III) quickly survey main
Supreme Court positions about reviewability over two centuries, and
(IV) advance a major idea, at variance with the Chaney decision,
that reviewing courts have responsibility not only to apply law but
also to exercise appropriate judicial discretion.
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I. THE Chaney OPINION
The Supreme Court's position about reviewability of administrative discretion is amazingly unsteady. The Court went strongly in
one direction in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975), and
then it went strongly in the opposite direction in Chaney in 1985 on
about the same question of reviewability of nonenforcement
discretion.
The Administrative Law Treatise says in section 28:6 that the

Bachowski case "overshadows all other law" on the subject of unreviewable administrative action. In Bachowski, the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act, refused to file civil suit to set aside an allegedly invalid union
election. Despite the lack of law to apply, the Supreme Court held
the Secretary's decision reviewable for arbitrariness. The Chaney
case is essentially the opposite of Bachowski, and it is now the overshadowing case. The Chaney decision could prove to be as temporary
as Bachowski, which lasted only ten years.
What is important about the Chaney case is not the narrow decision on the particular facts but the Court's comprehensive discussion
of reviewability, a discussion that was mostly independent of the peculiar facts.
In Chaney, prisoners sentenced to execution asserted that use of
specified drugs for lethal injection violated a statute. The question
for the Supreme Court was not whether the statute was violated but
whether the Food and Drug Administration's discretionary refusal
"to take various investigatory and enforcement actions" was reviewable. The D.C. Circuit had held the FDA's refusal reviewable and
had also held it an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held the
refusal unreviewable.
What is vital is the basis for the Supreme Court's decision, because it may control many decisions about reviewability of administrative action. The key statement came in the Court's discussion of
the APA provision, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), which exempts from review agency action committed to agency discretion by law. The
Court asserted:
[E]ven where Congress has not affirmatively precluded review, review is
not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion.

470 U.S. at 830. The central idea of the Chaney opinion is that ad-

ministrative action is unreviewable if the reviewing court has no
meaningful standard to guide its review.

The Chaney guide to reviewability does not mean that reviewability requires a statute that provides a "meaningful standard." The
Court said only that the reviewing court must "have" such a standard; the Court did not say that the standard must come from the
particular statute. Then what might be the source of the "meaningful standard"? Might it be the same source as that of the common
law in general - judicial ideas about justice and propriety? From
the beginning of the common law, Anglo-American courts have always been guided by such omnipresent standards as "justice," "fairness," and "reasonableness." The meaning of those standards has
been judicially created and further developed from case to case, and
courts today continue to add, subtract, and modify such vague but
vital standards that guide all judicial action.
Without any mention of such broad standards that have always

guided judicial development of the common law, the Court in Chaney simply held that "review is not to be had if the statute is drawn
so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to
judge the agency's exercise of discretion. In such a case, the statute
('law') can be taken to have 'committed' the decisionmaking to the
agency's judgment absolutely." 470 U.S. at 830.
The Court did not say why such everpresent standards as "justice," "fairness," and "reasonableness" that necessarily guide all judicial action were insufficient. Those standards generally suffice on
problems not governed by a constitutional provision or a statute. Because such standards were obviously available in the Chaney case,
the Court's statement that the statute committed the decisionmaking
"to the agency's judgment absolutely" is unconvincing. Nothing that
Congress said or did indicated a legislative intent that administrative
discretion should be totally free from the normal judicial review for
abuse of discretion.
Even on new questions that have never before arisen, American
courts do not customarily deem themselves without standards to decide them; when a court finds no previously existing standard, it
often creates a standard, using as a base the traditions, customs, philosophies, attitudes, and assumptions that most judges share with
each other.
Apart from administrative law, when an American court is confronted with an entirely new problem that is governed by no statute
and by no prior decision, it never says it must give up for lack of law
to apply; it creates whatever law is needed to decide the case. Should

review of administrative action differ from all other law in that respect? Anyone who thinks about that question should conclude: Of
course not.
The Supreme Court's central assertion that judicial review must
be denied "if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no
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meaningful standard" fails to take into account not only judicial creativity in developing standards but also ignores the omnipresence of
such standards as "justice," "fairness," "reasonableness," and "common sense." Courts often make new law without guides or standards

that are particularly specified; courts always have guidance from legal traditions, philosophies, and understandings. Courts usually allow
agencies to make law in about the same way that courts make law;
for instance, countless statutes that an agency "may, in its discretion" take specified action are customarily valid even though the specific action the agency takes is not controlled by a "meaningful
standard."
As a test of what is said in the preceding paragraph, let us hypothetically assume that a new Chaney case arises which is identical in
all respects except that conclusive evidence is presented that the
drug will cause several hours of extreme pain and that the formula
can easily be changed in a designated way to make the death painless. Should the test still be whether "the statute is drawn so that a
court would have no meaningful standard," or should the Court use
the standards of reasonableness and common sense - standards that
all courts always have?
What if the agency's chemists are overloaded and the agency is
forced by its limited appropriation to decline to make some timeconsuming studies, including the one in the Chaney case? Should the
agency's determination of that question be reviewable? The answer
need not be a flat yes or a flat no; it might be that a court will review
only upon a strong showing of abuse of discretion. Courts should
generally steer clear of questions about how an agency should make
use of a limited staff, but probably a court should respond to a sufficient showing of serious abuse of discretion.
When a court has "no law to apply," it may still exercise judicial

discretion in deciding what to do, and sometimes it may properly
exercise discretion in creating the law it needs. Before the Supreme
Court decided the Overton Park case, it had no doctrine about "no
law to apply." That did not prevent it from making a decision; out of

its decision and its opinion came its new law about "no law to
apply."
II. THE "No LAW TO APPLY" CONCEPTION
The crucial words of the Chaney opinion are that "review is not to
be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of

discretion."
Those words are part and parcel of the "no law to apply" conception that stems from Overton Park. The Court in Overton Park
seemed to say that a court may not review when it has no law to

apply. The Chaney opinion picks up that idea when it says that

agency action is unreviewable in the absence of a meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion.
Since the broad standards that generally guide judicial action
(such as justice, fairness, and reasonableness) are always present,
why are those broad standards not sufficient in the Chaney case?
The only answer is: The Court, without discussing such broad standards, held that "review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so
that a court would have no meaningful standard. . .

."

The Court

did not address the question whether the everpresent standards were
present and it did not discuss the question whether such standards
suffice. Yet it held that it had "no meaningful standard," without
mentioning and apparently without considering such omnipresent
standards as justice, fairness, and reasonableness.
The Chaney decision is clearly sound if the Overton Park idea is
used as the starting point. But the Overton Park idea is clearly inconsistent with the APA, which sometimes requires review for
"abuse of discretion." The question whether or not an agency has
abused its discretion may or may not involve law; the particular
question about abuse of discretion may be unique and review of it
may call only for judicialjudgment, not law. When a court determines whether an agency has abused its discretion, the court's decision may rest wholly on the court's own discretion and not at all
upon law.
III. REVIEWABILITY LAW OVER Two CENTURIES

From the beginning, the Supreme Court has deemed itself free to
review some administrative action and not to review other administrative action. It has taken positions at nearly all points of the compass - some extreme in one direction, some extreme in the opposite
direction, and some in the middle.
Looking at all the cases in large perspective seems to pull strongly
toward some middle position; the extreme cases in both directions
tend to offset each other.
The cases can readily be classified into three categories: Extreme
unreviewability, extreme requirements of review and even of de novo
review, and moderate decisions in a central category.
In the two centuries, the Chaney case has no rival in its entitlement to first place in the first category.
For three quarters of a century, a presumption of unreviewability
of administrative action generally prevailed under Martin v. Mott,

[VOL. 25: 1, 1988]

"No Law to Apply"
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 29 (1827), holding that an officer with authority to administer a statute was "the sole and exclusive judge" of
the facts. In Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840), a
naval officer's widow was denied review of refusal of a pension. The
Court seemed to reverse the presumption of unreviewability in
American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94
(1902), in which the Court said the Postmaster General's issuance of
a fraud order was "a clear mistake of law . . . and the courts, therefore, must have power in a proper proceeding to grant relief. Otherwise, the individual is left to the absolutely uncontrolled and arbitrary action of a public and administrative officer." Id. at 110. That
language could have been appropriately applied in the Chaney case.
The Court in the American School case of 1902 had no law to

apply, so it did what was obviously sensible; it created law to apply,
and the law it created was so good that in a broad sense it has prevailed ever since, with some exceptions.
The worst departure from the American School case in one direction might be the Chaney case, and the worst departure in the opposite direction might be three cases holding that the Constitution not
only required review but de novo review - Ohio Valley Water Co.
v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920) (rate fixing); Ng Fung
Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922) (deportation); and Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (workmen's compensation).
Even when a statute seems to provide for no review, the Supreme
Court may review. For instance, an immigration statute that said
nothing about review was amended in 1917 to provide that "the decision of the Secretary. . .shall be final." The Court held that "the
ambiguous word 'final'" did not cut off judicial review. Shaughnessy
v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955).
A reasonable and sound middle view was taken in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967), in which the Court
made a full analysis of the APA and firmly declared that "judicial
review of a final agency action. . . will not be cut off unless there is
persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress."
The Abbott case pulled toward reviewability by asserting strongly
that the APA "provides specifically . . . for review of final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court."
Throughout the two centuries, criminal prosecutors' discretion has
been generally free from judicial review for abuse of discretion. Even
so, it has been less than completely unreviewable. For instance, the
Court recently summarized the law by saying in Wayte v. United

States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985), that
although prosecutorial discretion is broad it is not "'unfettered.' Selectivity
in the enforcement of criminal laws is . . .subject to constitutional restraints." United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979).

Did not the Court have equal reason in the Chaney case for saying
that the Food and Drug Administration was subject to constitutional restraints?
The Wayte and Chaney cases were before the Court at the same
time, and yet the two decisions are essentially opposites. Why did the
Court not say in Wayte what it said in Chaney - that "review is not
to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard"? Why did the Court not say in Chaney what it said
in Wayte - that discretionary selectivity is "subject to constitutional restraints"? The only standard in each case was the general
idea of reasonableness; that standard was enough for review in
Wayte but not in Chaney. The contrast between Wayte and Chaney
is sharp; the only way to explain the two cases when they are consid-

ered together is by observing that the Supreme Court assumes that it
has absolute discretion to choose between reviewing and not reviewing. The Court departed from its customary stance of reasonably explaining how its action fits into what it has done before, or at least
trying to justify its departure from past positions. It almost always
avoids opposite positions in two cases pending at the same time.
Looking back, in the large perspective of two centuries, four cases
stand out as especially extreme, so extreme as to appear to be aberrations. They are the Chaney case, cutting off review of unguided
administrative discretion, and the three cases of 1920-32 that the
Constitution requires de novo review.
The best judicial thinking has been widely distributed, but especially admirable for its invention of guides that have lasted for
nearly a century is the American School opinion of 1902. Surely
almost everyone is likely to agree that the worst thinking has been in
the four most extreme cases, three at one extreme and one at the
opposite extreme.
The Court's appraisal of its own capacity might be the lowest in
the Chaney opinion that it has ever been. The Court seems to say
that it is unable to decide a question of justice o" reasonableness
unless a statute has stated "a meaningful standard." The Court
clearly has that capacity; throughout its history it has developed
common law and it has given meaning to due process. Yet in the
Chaney opinion, it asserts helplessness unless Congress has provided
"a meaningful standard." That is its main holding, for it says without qualification that "even where Congress has not affirmatively
precluded review, review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so
that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to
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judge the agency's exercise of discretion." 470 U.S. at 830.
Our glance at two centuries of reviewability of administrative action makes the contrast seem unbelievable between (1) the 1920,
1922, and 1932 position of the Supreme Court that the Constitution
requires not merely review but de novo review, and (2) the 1985
position of the Supreme Court that in absence of a statutory statement of a standard courts are helpless to review administrative action at all.
Both extremes are harmful. A middle position is much better. The
Abbott position is a middle one, but the court rejected it in the Chaney case.
In light of the long history, one may be reasonably sure that the
Court's preference for the extreme Chaney view will not long endure.
But the Court is unlikely to return to the opposite extreme. In the
long run, something in the middle should and will prevail, and the
Abbott position is a leading contender for that honor.
IV.

REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION ON THE BASIS OF
JUDICIAL DISCRETION, WITHOUT APPLYING LAW

Courts often review administrative action when they have no law
to apply. The APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), requires that agency action be set aside if found to be "an abuse of discretion." What is or
is not "an abuse of discretion" is for the reviewing court to determine, and making the determination of whether discretion has been
abused may or may not be guided by law. Often that particular
problem is unique and the question whether the agency has abused
its discretion is a matter for judicial discretion, in whole or in part.
Specifically what is or is not an abuse of discretion may be fully
guided by law, guided in part, or guided not at all. The question
whether an agency has abused its discretion is thus often, in whole or
in part, a matter for judicial judgment or discretion.
When a reviewing court exercises its own discretion in deciding,

without applying law, whether or not the agency has abused its discretion, the lack of law for the court to apply does not mean that the
administrative action is unreviewable.
Some of the most delicate decisionmaking by reviewing courts involves exercise of judicial discretion. A court cannot determine the
reasonableness of administrative action except by using the court's
own subjective judgment; that is about the same as saying that a
court cannot determine whether the agency has abused its discretion
except by using the court's own subjective judgment.

Despite the language of the Overton Park case and of the cases
that follow it, "no law to apply" does not mean no judicial review,
for a court, without law to apply, may exercise judicial judgment or
judicial discretion in deciding whether or not to find the agency's
action an abuse of discretion.
What has just been said in this part IV is in some degree at variance with the Chaney opinion, for the main holding was that "review
is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no
meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of
discretion." 470 U.S. at 830. A reviewing court always has the
meaningful standard of reasonableness, that is, the court's own judicial judgment about reasonableness. Judges in general are experts in
reasonableness, and their judgment about reasonableness is a vital
part of judicial review of administrative action. Whether or not a
reviewing court has "law to apply" in reviewing administrative action, it can always use its expertness in appraising reasonableness of
administrative action.
Some of the recent case law, including the Chaney case, is temporarily at variance with what has been said in this part IV. But the
pre-Overton Park law is generally in accord, and so is most of the
post-Overton Park law.
In absence of specific statutory language limiting review, few if
any federal judges are likely to find that absence of law to apply
prevents a reviewing court from determining as a matter of judicial
judgment or discretion whether particular administrative action is
reasonable.
In other words, law to apply is not generally a prerequisite to
judicial review of administrative action.
Examples of Supreme Court decisions that are fully in accord with
what has just been said are numerous. A single example should suffice. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm
Mutual, 463 U.S. 29 (1983), the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration rescinded a requirement of automatic seatbelts or
airbags, and the Supreme Court held the rescission to be arbitrary
and capricious. The basis for the holding was the Court's own judgment or discretion that "given the judgment made in 1977 that
airbags are an effective and cost-beneficial life-saving technology, the
mandatory passive restraint rule may not be abandoned without any
consideration whatsoever of an airbags-only requirement." Id. at 51.
In the quoted words, the Court was not applying law; it was exercising judicial discretion in the light of the unique facts.
The idea that a court that is reviewing administrative action is
helpless when it has no law to apply has done a great deal of harm.
In absence of law to apply, a reviewing court may exercise its own
discretion in deciding whether or not the agency has abused its dis-
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cretion; to the extent that the Chaney case holds otherwise, it will
not endure.
Another way to say what has just been said is obvious and extremely elementary but it has to be emphasized in italics: The Court
in its Overton Park and Chaney opinions has assumed that the
tasks of judges in reviewing for abuse of discretion are two -finding facts and applying law. The necessary reality is that the tasks
of judges who review for abuse of discretion are three - finding
facts, applying law, and exercising judicial discretion.
V.

CONCLUSION

The precise point where the Supreme Court went wrong in the
Chaney opinion was in its assumption that a reviewing court had to
deem itself helpless on account of absence of law to apply. That assumption was unfortunate for two overlapping reasons: (1) Law requiring justice, fairness, and reasonableness is always present in any
American court, never absent. (2) Even if a reviewing court takes
the position that it has no law to apply, it normally can and should
exercise judicial discretion in deciding whether the agency has
abused its discretion.

